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71.6.199.23 has a very high threat confidence level of 100%, originating from United States, on the CariNet, Inc. network (10439). It has been observed across 1,563 sessions targeting SMTP, HTTPS, HTTP, IMAP, FTP and 11 other protocols, First observed on January 20, 2026, most recently active March 3, 2026.
Identifies coordinated Redis service reconnaissance consisting of INFO retrieval, CLIENT LIST enumeration of connected peers, and incremental keyspace iteration via SCAN. This tightly grouped pattern reflects automated or manual post-access mapping of server configuration, active clients, and stored keyspace structure. The sequence indicates structured environment profiling prior to potential data extraction or exploitation.
Client sends RTSP OPTIONS requests to check supported methods and confirm that an RTSP service is exposed, then disconnects without attempting authentication or stream setup. This pattern is typically associated with automated reconnaissance or internet-wide scanning rather than active stream access.
Automated SMTP interaction performing a minimal capability check by issuing EHLO followed by a STARTTLS upgrade request and immediately terminating the session. This pattern is commonly associated with internet-wide scanners, security research crawlers, or opportunistic bots verifying whether an SMTP service supports encrypted communication. The absence of authentication attempts or message submission indicates reconnaissance or service fingerprinting rather than active abuse.
Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.
Identifies HTTPS requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration
FTP session where the client issues AUTH TLS to upgrade the connection to Transport Layer Security. This reflects protocol-level encryption negotiation prior to further interaction.
Client repeatedly sends GET requests to the /bad-request Docker API endpoint, indicating malformed or incompatible traffic against the Docker daemon. This pattern is typically associated with generic internet scanning or tools attempting HTTP interaction without speaking the proper Docker API protocol.
| Date | Category | Protocol | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 27, 2026 | Brute Force | SSH | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |