Check an IP Address, Domain Name, Subnet, or ASN
71.6.135.131 has a threat confidence score of 100%. This IP address from United States (AS10439, CariNet, Inc.) has been observed in 2,672 honeypot sessions and reported 4 times targeting SMTP, HTTPS, FTP, IMAP, HTTP and 13 other protocols. First observed on January 20, 2026, most recently active April 15, 2026.
Identifies RDP clients attempting authentication using the legacy RDP security mode where credentials are exchanged through the older RDP security layer instead of Network Level Authentication (NLA). This indicates the client negotiated legacy plaintext authentication during the RDP security handshake
Identifies coordinated Redis service reconnaissance consisting of INFO retrieval, CLIENT LIST enumeration of connected peers, and incremental keyspace iteration via SCAN. This tightly grouped pattern reflects automated or manual post-access mapping of server configuration, active clients, and stored keyspace structure. The sequence indicates structured environment profiling prior to potential data extraction or exploitation.
SIP request using sip:nm as the Request-URI, a malformed or placeholder target commonly observed in SIP scanning and fuzzing activity rather than legitimate client behavior.
Client sends RTSP OPTIONS requests to check supported methods and confirm that an RTSP service is exposed, then disconnects without attempting authentication or stream setup. This pattern is typically associated with automated reconnaissance or internet-wide scanning rather than active stream access.
Automated SMTP interaction performing a minimal capability check by issuing EHLO followed by a STARTTLS upgrade request and immediately terminating the session. This pattern is commonly associated with internet-wide scanners, security research crawlers, or opportunistic bots verifying whether an SMTP service supports encrypted communication. The absence of authentication attempts or message submission indicates reconnaissance or service fingerprinting rather than active abuse.
FTP session where the client issues AUTH TLS to upgrade the connection to Transport Layer Security. This reflects protocol-level encryption negotiation prior to further interaction.
HTTPS request to /robots.txt.
Client repeatedly sends GET requests to the /bad-request Docker API endpoint, indicating malformed or incompatible traffic against the Docker daemon. This pattern is typically associated with generic internet scanning or tools attempting HTTP interaction without speaking the proper Docker API protocol.
Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.
Identifies HTTPS requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration
| Reporter | Date | Category | Protocol | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| User | Mar 17, 2026, 13:16 | Brute Force | RTSP | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |
| User | Mar 4, 2026, 20:41 | Brute Force | HTTP | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |
| User | Mar 1, 2026, 10:15 | Brute Force | SMB | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |
| User | Feb 27, 2026, 19:17 | Brute Force | SSH | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |