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71.6.134.232 has a very high threat confidence level of 99%, originating from United States, on the CariNet, Inc. network (10439). It has been observed across 378 sessions targeting HTTPS, HTTP, SMB, SSH, IMAP and 10 other protocols, First observed on January 20, 2026, most recently active March 11, 2026.
Client sends RTSP OPTIONS requests to check supported methods and confirm that an RTSP service is exposed, then disconnects without attempting authentication or stream setup. This pattern is typically associated with automated reconnaissance or internet-wide scanning rather than active stream access.
Identifies Redis service discovery and basic environment enumeration where an actor probes with invalid commands, validates availability using PING, retrieves server metadata via INFO (case variations), and gracefully exits with QUIT. This pattern is commonly used to fingerprint exposed Redis instances before exploitation.
Identifies an automated Redis service probing sequence consisting of PING, INFO (uppercase invocation), execution of a deliberately nonexistent command to assess error handling behavior, and QUIT. This tightly grouped pattern reflects reconnaissance and fingerprinting activity used by scanners and exploitation frameworks to determine Redis version, configuration details, and command availability prior to follow-on exploitation attempts. The inclusion of a nonexistent command indicates capability probing rather than normal client interaction.
Identifies HTTPS requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration
Client repeatedly sends GET requests to the /bad-request Docker API endpoint, indicating malformed or incompatible traffic against the Docker daemon. This pattern is typically associated with generic internet scanning or tools attempting HTTP interaction without speaking the proper Docker API protocol.
Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.
FTP session where the client issues AUTH TLS to upgrade the connection to Transport Layer Security. This reflects protocol-level encryption negotiation prior to further interaction.
Identifies HTTP GET requests directly targeting the /bad-request path, indicating automated or manual probing of application error-handling routes rather than legitimate navigation flow.
| Date | Category | Protocol | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mar 9, 2026 | Brute Force | SSH | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |
| Mar 8, 2026 | Brute Force | FTP | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |
| Mar 2, 2026 | Brute Force | TELNET | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |