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95.215.0.144 has a threat confidence score of 100%. This IP address from Russia (AS34665, Petersburg Internet Network ltd.) has been observed in 12,016 honeypot sessions and reported 21 times targeting HTTPS, SMTP, HTTP, SSH, FTP and 12 other protocols. First observed on January 20, 2026, most recently active May 11, 2026.
Identifies a MongoDB reconnaissance sequence where an actor initiates legacy authentication negotiation using the getnonce command followed by an isMaster topology discovery request that discloses client metadata for the mgo Go driver on a Linux amd64 system. This pattern reflects automated tooling or scripted clients performing server capability validation, authentication workflow testing, and environment fingerprinting prior to further database interaction.
Client first performs a generic request to the Elasticsearch root endpoint to verify service availability, then proceeds to request /_cat/indices. This sequence reflects staged Elasticsearch reconnaissance where the actor validates that the cluster is reachable before attempting index enumeration and data exposure assessment. Compared to direct index enumeration behaviors, the interaction begins with a service-validation step, suggesting adaptive probing rather than immediate Elasticsearch-specific targeting.
FTP session where an empty control-channel command is observed in conjunction with non-printable binary data on the control channel. This pattern reflects malformed or non-FTP-compliant input, commonly seen during TLS handshake attempts on plaintext endpoints, protocol confusion, or automated scanner misfires.
FTP session where the client negotiates binary transfer mode, enters extended passive mode (EPSV), and issues an MLSD command to retrieve a machine-readable directory listing.
Identifies HTTPS requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration
Identifies execution of the Redis INFO command (case-insensitive), which retrieves server configuration, version, memory usage, and runtime statistics. This behavior reflects service interrogation and environment fingerprinting activity. While INFO can be used legitimately by administrators, it is also commonly observed during automated scanning and pre-exploitation reconnaissance of exposed Redis instances.
HTTP request using GET method.
Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.
Identifies HTTP GET requests directly targeting the /bad-request path, indicating automated or manual probing of application error-handling routes rather than legitimate navigation flow.
Client repeatedly sends GET requests to the /bad-request Docker API endpoint, indicating malformed or incompatible traffic against the Docker daemon. This pattern is typically associated with generic internet scanning or tools attempting HTTP interaction without speaking the proper Docker API protocol.
| Reporter | Date | Category | Protocol | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonymous | May 11, 2026, 08:10 | Brute Force | MYSQL | SikkerGuard: 80 blocked packets |
| Anonymous | May 10, 2026, 20:09 | Brute Force | HTTPS | SikkerGuard: 17 blocked packets |
| Anonymous | May 10, 2026, 03:39 | Brute Force | — | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |
| Anonymous | May 10, 2026, 24:39 | Brute Force | HTTPS | SikkerGuard: 19 blocked packets |
| Anonymous | May 9, 2026, 20:39 | Brute Force | MYSQL | SikkerGuard: 78 blocked packets |