Looking up IP
Check an IP Address, Domain Name, Subnet, or ASN
85.217.149.16 has a very high threat confidence level of 95%, originating from Beauharnois, Canada, on the Modat B.V. network (209334). It has been observed across 536 sessions targeting SIP, SMTP, HTTPS, IMAP, SSH and 13 other protocols, First observed on January 20, 2026, most recently active March 10, 2026.
Client sends RTSP OPTIONS requests to check supported methods and confirm that an RTSP service is exposed, then disconnects without attempting authentication or stream setup. This pattern is typically associated with automated reconnaissance or internet-wide scanning rather than active stream access.
FTP session where an empty control-channel command is observed in conjunction with non-printable binary data on the control channel. This pattern reflects malformed or non-FTP-compliant input, commonly seen during TLS handshake attempts on plaintext endpoints, protocol confusion, or automated scanner misfires.
Identifies Redis service discovery and basic environment enumeration where an actor probes with invalid commands, validates availability using PING, retrieves server metadata via INFO (case variations), and gracefully exits with QUIT. This pattern is commonly used to fingerprint exposed Redis instances before exploitation.
Identifies an automated Redis service probing sequence consisting of PING, INFO (uppercase invocation), execution of a deliberately nonexistent command to assess error handling behavior, and QUIT. This tightly grouped pattern reflects reconnaissance and fingerprinting activity used by scanners and exploitation frameworks to determine Redis version, configuration details, and command availability prior to follow-on exploitation attempts. The inclusion of a nonexistent command indicates capability probing rather than normal client interaction.
Identifies HTTPS requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration
Automated SMTP interaction performing a minimal capability check by issuing EHLO followed by a STARTTLS upgrade request and immediately terminating the session. This pattern is commonly associated with internet-wide scanners, security research crawlers, or opportunistic bots verifying whether an SMTP service supports encrypted communication. The absence of authentication attempts or message submission indicates reconnaissance or service fingerprinting rather than active abuse.
Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.
Identifies HTTP GET requests directly targeting the /bad-request path, indicating automated or manual probing of application error-handling routes rather than legitimate navigation flow.
Client repeatedly sends GET requests to the /bad-request Docker API endpoint, indicating malformed or incompatible traffic against the Docker daemon. This pattern is typically associated with generic internet scanning or tools attempting HTTP interaction without speaking the proper Docker API protocol.