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85.217.140.28 has a threat confidence score of 94%. This IP address from France (AS209334, Modat B.V.) has been observed in 238 honeypot sessions and reported 7 times targeting SMTP, HTTPS, SIP, RTSP, SSH and 12 other protocols. First observed on February 12, 2026, most recently active March 20, 2026.
Client sends RTSP OPTIONS requests to check supported methods and confirm that an RTSP service is exposed, then disconnects without attempting authentication or stream setup. This pattern is typically associated with automated reconnaissance or internet-wide scanning rather than active stream access.
Identifies Redis service discovery and basic environment enumeration where an actor probes with invalid commands, validates availability using PING, retrieves server metadata via INFO (case variations), and gracefully exits with QUIT. This pattern is commonly used to fingerprint exposed Redis instances before exploitation.
Identifies an automated Redis service probing sequence consisting of PING, INFO (uppercase invocation), execution of a deliberately nonexistent command to assess error handling behavior, and QUIT. This tightly grouped pattern reflects reconnaissance and fingerprinting activity used by scanners and exploitation frameworks to determine Redis version, configuration details, and command availability prior to follow-on exploitation attempts. The inclusion of a nonexistent command indicates capability probing rather than normal client interaction.
Identifies HTTPS requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration
Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.
Automated SMTP interaction performing a minimal capability check by issuing EHLO followed by a STARTTLS upgrade request and immediately terminating the session. This pattern is commonly associated with internet-wide scanners, security research crawlers, or opportunistic bots verifying whether an SMTP service supports encrypted communication. The absence of authentication attempts or message submission indicates reconnaissance or service fingerprinting rather than active abuse.
Client repeatedly sends GET requests to the /bad-request Docker API endpoint, indicating malformed or incompatible traffic against the Docker daemon. This pattern is typically associated with generic internet scanning or tools attempting HTTP interaction without speaking the proper Docker API protocol.
| Reporter | Date | Category | Protocol | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| User | Mar 8, 2026, 01:42 | Brute Force | SSH | SikkerGuard: 14 blocked packets |
| User | Mar 6, 2026, 12:42 | Brute Force | SSH | SikkerGuard: 14 blocked packets |
| User | Mar 6, 2026, 03:12 | Brute Force | FTP | SikkerGuard: 24 blocked packets |
| User | Mar 3, 2026, 23:10 | Brute Force | DOCKER | SikkerGuard: 14 blocked packets |
| User | Mar 3, 2026, 19:40 | Brute Force | SMTP | SikkerGuard: 14 blocked packets |