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66.132.172.140 has a threat confidence score of 98%. This IP address from United States (AS398324, Censys, Inc.) has been observed in 97 honeypot sessions and reported 2 times targeting HTTPS, HTTP, RDP, SMTP, SSH and 5 other protocols. First observed on March 20, 2026, most recently active March 25, 2026.
Remote client performs MongoDB service validation and environment fingerprinting by first initiating a wire-protocol handshake (ismaster / hello) followed by execution of the buildInfo command against the admin database. This sequence indicates targeted reconnaissance to determine server role, software version, build characteristics, and platform details. Such activity is commonly associated with automated scanning frameworks and pre-exploitation tooling used to assess exposure and identify version-specific vulnerabilities prior to authentication attempts or database enumeration
Identifies RDP clients attempting authentication using the legacy RDP security mode where credentials are exchanged through the older RDP security layer instead of Network Level Authentication (NLA). This indicates the client negotiated legacy plaintext authentication during the RDP security handshake
Identifies an automated Redis service probing sequence consisting of PING, INFO (uppercase invocation), execution of a deliberately nonexistent command to assess error handling behavior, and QUIT. This tightly grouped pattern reflects reconnaissance and fingerprinting activity used by scanners and exploitation frameworks to determine Redis version, configuration details, and command availability prior to follow-on exploitation attempts. The inclusion of a nonexistent command indicates capability probing rather than normal client interaction.
Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.
FTP session where the client issues AUTH TLS to upgrade the connection to Transport Layer Security. This reflects protocol-level encryption negotiation prior to further interaction.
Identifies HTTPS requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration
Identifies HTTP GET requests directly targeting the /bad-request path, indicating automated or manual probing of application error-handling routes rather than legitimate navigation flow.
SMTP interaction identified as an internet-wide scanning probe originating from Censys infrastructure. The client announces itself via EHLO www.censys.io and issues a STARTTLS request to verify TLS upgrade support and collect service capability metadata. This pattern reflects automated reconnaissance and exposure mapping rather than direct exploitation, but still represents active external probing of the SMTP service.
| Reporter | Date | Category | Protocol | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| User | Mar 22, 2026, 02:54 | Brute Force | DOCKER | SikkerGuard: 16 blocked packets |
| User | Mar 21, 2026, 01:53 | Brute Force | SMTP | SikkerGuard: 10 blocked packets |