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52.146.90.191 has a threat confidence score of 94%. This IP address from United States (AS8075, Microsoft Corporation) has been observed in 153 honeypot sessions targeting HTTPS, SSH, HTTP, DOCKER, ELASTICSEARCH and 11 other protocols. Detected attack patterns include https autodiscover powershell probe. First observed on January 20, 2026, most recently active April 18, 2026.
HTTPS request to /autodiscover/autodiscover.json with a query string containing @zdi/Powershell.
SIP activity where the Call-ID follows a token@IP format, a pattern commonly generated by automated scanners and SIP tooling rather than standard client implementations, indicating non-human or enumeration-driven behavior.
Client repeatedly sends GET requests to the /bad-request Docker API endpoint, indicating malformed or incompatible traffic against the Docker daemon. This pattern is typically associated with generic internet scanning or tools attempting HTTP interaction without speaking the proper Docker API protocol.
FTP session where the client issues AUTH TLS to upgrade the connection to Transport Layer Security. This reflects protocol-level encryption negotiation prior to further interaction.
Identifies HTTPS requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration
HTTP request using GET method.
Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.
Identifies HTTP GET requests directly targeting the /bad-request path, indicating automated or manual probing of application error-handling routes rather than legitimate navigation flow.
Identifies execution of the Redis INFO command (case-insensitive), which retrieves server configuration, version, memory usage, and runtime statistics. This behavior reflects service interrogation and environment fingerprinting activity. While INFO can be used legitimately by administrators, it is also commonly observed during automated scanning and pre-exploitation reconnaissance of exposed Redis instances.