Check an IP Address, Domain Name, Subnet, or ASN
5.101.64.6 has a threat confidence score of 100%. This IP address from Russia (AS34665, Petersburg Internet Network ltd.) has been observed in 4,559 honeypot sessions and reported 7 times targeting HTTP, HTTPS, SSH, MONGODB, REDIS and 11 other protocols. First observed on January 21, 2026, most recently active April 21, 2026.
Identifies a MongoDB reconnaissance sequence where an actor initiates legacy authentication negotiation using the getnonce command followed by an isMaster topology discovery request that discloses client metadata for the mgo Go driver on a Linux amd64 system. This pattern reflects automated tooling or scripted clients performing server capability validation, authentication workflow testing, and environment fingerprinting prior to further database interaction.
Client first performs a generic request to the Elasticsearch root endpoint to verify service availability, then proceeds to request /_cat/indices. This sequence reflects staged Elasticsearch reconnaissance where the actor validates that the cluster is reachable before attempting index enumeration and data exposure assessment. Compared to direct index enumeration behaviors, the interaction begins with a service-validation step, suggesting adaptive probing rather than immediate Elasticsearch-specific targeting.
FTP session where the client negotiates binary transfer mode, enters extended passive mode (EPSV), and issues an MLSD command to retrieve a machine-readable directory listing.
FTP session where an empty control-channel command is observed in conjunction with non-printable binary data on the control channel. This pattern reflects malformed or non-FTP-compliant input, commonly seen during TLS handshake attempts on plaintext endpoints, protocol confusion, or automated scanner misfires.
HTTP request using GET method.
Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.
Client repeatedly sends GET requests to the /bad-request Docker API endpoint, indicating malformed or incompatible traffic against the Docker daemon. This pattern is typically associated with generic internet scanning or tools attempting HTTP interaction without speaking the proper Docker API protocol.
Identifies execution of the Redis INFO command (case-insensitive), which retrieves server configuration, version, memory usage, and runtime statistics. This behavior reflects service interrogation and environment fingerprinting activity. While INFO can be used legitimately by administrators, it is also commonly observed during automated scanning and pre-exploitation reconnaissance of exposed Redis instances.
Identifies HTTP GET requests directly targeting the /bad-request path, indicating automated or manual probing of application error-handling routes rather than legitimate navigation flow.
FTP session where the client issues AUTH TLS to upgrade the connection to Transport Layer Security. This reflects protocol-level encryption negotiation prior to further interaction.
| Reporter | Date | Category | Protocol | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| User | Mar 19, 2026, 10:29 | Brute Force | MYSQL | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |
| User | Mar 17, 2026, 11:40 | Brute Force | HTTPS | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |
| User | Mar 14, 2026, 16:54 | Brute Force | REDIS | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |
| User | Mar 13, 2026, 12:06 | Brute Force | MSSQL | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |
| User | Mar 13, 2026, 03:41 | Brute Force | DOCKER | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |