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47.239.252.212 has a threat confidence score of 100%. This IP address from Hong Kong (AS45102, Alibaba US Technology Co., Ltd.) has been observed in 456 honeypot sessions targeting HTTPS, IMAP, RDP, SMB, SIP and 12 other protocols. First observed on March 8, 2026, most recently active March 20, 2026.
Identifies RDP clients attempting authentication using the legacy RDP security mode where credentials are exchanged through the older RDP security layer instead of Network Level Authentication (NLA). This indicates the client negotiated legacy plaintext authentication during the RDP security handshake
Client performs a full RTSP interaction sequence — OPTIONS, DESCRIBE, SETUP, and PLAY — indicating an attempt to initialize and access a media stream. This pattern reflects active interaction with a streaming service rather than simple probing, and is commonly seen when automated tools or unauthorized clients try to view exposed camera or RTSP feeds.
Enumerates MongoDB server metadata and storage characteristics across multiple databases by issuing commands such as buildInfo, serverStatus, hostInfo, features, and isMaster, followed by systematic dbStats and collStats queries against common databases including admin, config, local, test, and production. This behavior reflects structured reconnaissance intended to map server capabilities, deployment topology, and data footprint prior to potential follow-on actions.
Client performs a full RTSP interaction sequence — OPTIONS, DESCRIBE, SETUP, and PLAY — indicating an attempt to initialize and access a media stream. This pattern reflects active interaction with a streaming service rather than simple probing, and is commonly seen when automated tools or unauthorized clients try to view exposed camera or RTSP feeds.
Client sends RTSP OPTIONS requests to check supported methods and confirm that an RTSP service is exposed, then disconnects without attempting authentication or stream setup. This pattern is typically associated with automated reconnaissance or internet-wide scanning rather than active stream access.
Client first performs a generic request to the Elasticsearch root endpoint to verify service availability, then proceeds to request /_cat/indices. This sequence reflects staged Elasticsearch reconnaissance where the actor validates that the cluster is reachable before attempting index enumeration and data exposure assessment. Compared to direct index enumeration behaviors, the interaction begins with a service-validation step, suggesting adaptive probing rather than immediate Elasticsearch-specific targeting.
Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.
Identifies HTTPS requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration