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35.233.95.0 has a threat confidence score of 100%. This IP address from Belgium (AS396982, Google LLC) has been observed in 948 honeypot sessions targeting FTP, MONGODB, SMB, POSTGRES, HTTPS and 5 other protocols. Detected attack patterns include mysql full application schema reconnaissance, mysql application environment tier reconnaissance. First observed on January 21, 2026, most recently active April 12, 2026.
Structured enumeration of MySQL server metadata and multiple application-related schemas (analytics, app, app_prod, metrics) combined with dataset sizing and record-count profiling of key tables such as users, sessions, api_keys, projects, and audit_logs. The activity indicates deliberate mapping of database structure, data volume assessment, and identification of high-value datasets consistent with pre-collection reconnaissance or staging for targeted data access or exfiltration.
Adversary performs structured enumeration of MySQL databases and application environment tiers including development (app_dev), production (app_prod), backup (backup), logging (logs), and primary application schemas. The activity combines schema discovery, metadata inspection, dataset sizing, and record-count profiling across operational and lifecycle-segmented datasets. This pattern indicates deliberate mapping of deployment topology, data replication surfaces, and log retention locations to identify high-value targets and potential data exfiltration or impact paths.
Identifies a structured MongoDB reconnaissance sequence performed by a modern PyMongo client operating from a Kubernetes-orchestrated Linux container. The actor negotiates server capabilities using a hello / ismaster handshake, enumerates server build metadata via buildinfo, performs lightweight database name discovery using listDatabases with nameOnly, and explicitly terminates logical sessions using endSessions. This pattern reflects automated tooling or scripted workflows conducting deployment fingerprinting, access surface mapping, and compatibility validation prior to further database interaction.
FTP session where a client probes for valid usernames, attempts authentication, negotiates transfer settings (ASCII and UTF-8), retrieves the current working directory, changes directories, enters passive mode, issues directory listings, and sends NOOP to maintain the session. This sequence reflects structured post-authentication exploration of the FTP file system to map directory structure and available content.
Composite behavior identifying authenticated SMB activity where a client accesses both IPC$ and data shares, performs root directory reads, and binds to SAMR and SRVSVC RPC interfaces. This sequence is consistent with structured remote enumeration of host configuration, shared resources, and account information, often conducted prior to lateral movement or privilege escalation attempts.
FTP session where the client enters passive mode (PASV) and issues a LIST command to retrieve a directory listing from the server.
FTP session where the client authenticates, queries the working directory, sets transfer mode, and enters passive mode without performing any file transfer or directory listing.
Identifies HTTPS requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration
Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.
HTTP request using GET method.