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35.216.195.77 has a threat confidence score of 100%. This IP address from Switzerland (AS15169, Google LLC) has been observed in 2,281 honeypot sessions and reported 3 times targeting HTTPS, SMB, FTP, HTTP, MONGODB and 2 other protocols. Detected attack patterns include https dotenv environment file exposure probe, smb ipc netlogon samr srvsvc rpc chain, http git repository config exposure probe and 1 more. First observed on January 24, 2026, most recently active May 3, 2026.
Identifies an HTTPS request targeting a .env file in the web root or application directory. Access attempts to /.env indicate automated scanning for exposed environment configuration files that may contain application secrets, database credentials, API keys, or cloud tokens. This probe is commonly associated with opportunistic internet-wide scanning for misconfigured web deployments.
Session containing IPC$ share access, NETLOGON share access, root directory read, SAMR RPC bind, and SRVSVC pipe open with subsequent RPC bind. Represents this specific chained SMB RPC interaction pattern within a single session.
Identifies HTTP GET requests targeting /.git/config, indicating attempts to access exposed Git repository configuration files. Successful access may enable repository reconstruction, credential harvesting, or source code disclosure.
Identifies HTTP GET requests targeting the /.env file, indicating attempts to access exposed environment configuration files commonly containing application secrets such as database credentials, API keys, and service tokens.
Identifies an HTTPS request targeting the .git/config file within a web-accessible repository directory. Access attempts to /.git/config indicate automated repository exposure scanning intended to retrieve remote origin URLs, repository structure, and potentially credential-bearing configuration data. This is a common reconnaissance technique used to identify misconfigured web servers exposing version control metadata.
Composite behavior identifying authenticated SMB interaction where a client accesses the IPC$ share, performs root directory reads, binds to the SAMR RPC interface, and interacts with the SRVSVC service pipe. This sequence is consistent with remote host and account enumeration activity over SMB, typically used to gather domain, user, and share information prior to lateral movement or privilege escalation attempts.
Composite behavior identifying authenticated SMB activity where a client accesses both IPC$ and data shares, performs root directory reads, and binds to SAMR and SRVSVC RPC interfaces. This sequence is consistent with structured remote enumeration of host configuration, shared resources, and account information, often conducted prior to lateral movement or privilege escalation attempts.
Detects authenticated access to the IPC$ administrative share over SMB. This behavior indicates remote interaction with Windows inter-process communication mechanisms and is commonly observed during lateral movement, service enumeration, or preparation for remote command execution.
FTP session where an empty control-channel command is observed in conjunction with non-printable binary data on the control channel. This pattern reflects malformed or non-FTP-compliant input, commonly seen during TLS handshake attempts on plaintext endpoints, protocol confusion, or automated scanner misfires.
Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.
| Reporter | Date | Category | Protocol | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anonymous | May 2, 2026, 15:32 | Brute Force | HTTP | SikkerGuard: 68 blocked packets |
| Anonymous | Apr 29, 2026, 06:30 | Brute Force | HTTP | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |
| User | Feb 28, 2026, 14:45 | Brute Force | SSH | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |