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35.216.172.131 has a threat confidence score of 100%. This IP address from Switzerland (AS15169, Google LLC) has been observed in 1,234 honeypot sessions and reported 3 times targeting FTP, HTTPS, HTTP, MYSQL, MONGODB and 3 other protocols. Detected attack patterns include smb ipc netlogon samr srvsvc rpc chain. First observed on February 7, 2026, most recently active April 10, 2026.
Session containing IPC$ share access, NETLOGON share access, root directory read, SAMR RPC bind, and SRVSVC pipe open with subsequent RPC bind. Represents this specific chained SMB RPC interaction pattern within a single session.
Composite behavior identifying authenticated SMB interaction where a client accesses the IPC$ share, performs root directory reads, binds to the SAMR RPC interface, and interacts with the SRVSVC service pipe. This sequence is consistent with remote host and account enumeration activity over SMB, typically used to gather domain, user, and share information prior to lateral movement or privilege escalation attempts.
Composite behavior identifying authenticated SMB activity where a client accesses both IPC$ and data shares, performs root directory reads, and binds to SAMR and SRVSVC RPC interfaces. This sequence is consistent with structured remote enumeration of host configuration, shared resources, and account information, often conducted prior to lateral movement or privilege escalation attempts.
FTP session where an empty control-channel command is observed in conjunction with non-printable binary data on the control channel. This pattern reflects malformed or non-FTP-compliant input, commonly seen during TLS handshake attempts on plaintext endpoints, protocol confusion, or automated scanner misfires.
Identifies HTTPS requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration
Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.
Identifies HTTP GET requests directly targeting the /bad-request path, indicating automated or manual probing of application error-handling routes rather than legitimate navigation flow.
| Reporter | Date | Category | Protocol | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| User | Mar 17, 2026, 15:12 | Brute Force | SSH | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |
| User | Mar 14, 2026, 17:09 | Brute Force | FTP | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |
| User | Feb 28, 2026, 03:17 | Brute Force | SMB | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |