The client authenticated to a Redis service and executed the INFO command (info / redis_info_lowercase) without attempting configuration changes, data access, or command execution. The INFO command retrieves server metadata including version, role (master/replica), connected clients, memory usage, persistence settings, and replication status. This behavior is consistent with automated reconnaissance activity where a bot validates exposure, fingerprints the Redis instance, and determines whether it is a viable target for follow-up exploitation (e.g., replication abuse, module loading, or persistence manipulation). No destructive or modification activity was observed in this session.

HTTPS request to /developmentserver/metadatauploader.

Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.

FTP session where the client issues AUTH TLS to upgrade the connection to Transport Layer Security. This reflects protocol-level encryption negotiation prior to further interaction.

HTTP request using GET method.

Client repeatedly sends GET requests to the /bad-request Docker API endpoint, indicating malformed or incompatible traffic against the Docker daemon. This pattern is typically associated with generic internet scanning or tools attempting HTTP interaction without speaking the proper Docker API protocol.

Identifies execution of the Redis INFO command (case-insensitive), which retrieves server configuration, version, memory usage, and runtime statistics. This behavior reflects service interrogation and environment fingerprinting activity. While INFO can be used legitimately by administrators, it is also commonly observed during automated scanning and pre-exploitation reconnaissance of exposed Redis instances.