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191.5.48.172 has a threat confidence score of 100%. This IP address from Brazil (AS263532, VIAR TELECOMUNICACOES LTDA) has been observed in 54 honeypot sessions and reported 1 times targeting TELNET protocols. Detected attack patterns include telnet busybox shell activation with capability check, telnet shell escalation with busybox execution attempt, telnet busybox multi method payload retrieval and execution. First observed on February 16, 2026, most recently active March 24, 2026.
Identifies a Telnet session where BusyBox is leveraged to activate or access a shell environment (sh, shell, system, linuxshell, enable) followed by command capability validation (ping). This pattern reflects deliberate shell breakout and execution-context validation commonly observed in IoT botnets and embedded Linux compromise workflows. The presence of multiple shell invocation variants combined with BusyBox applet usage indicates adaptive execution logic rather than incidental command usage.
Telnet session exhibiting privilege escalation and shell breakout commands (enable, system, shell, sh) followed by execution of /bin/busybox with a non-standard or arbitrary applet name. The sequence indicates an attempt to escape restricted CLI environments and execute a staged or randomly named payload via BusyBox. The presence of an unknown BusyBox applet strongly suggests automated bot deployment logic rather than legitimate administrative activity.
Identifies a Telnet session where an attacker leverages BusyBox utilities to retrieve a remote payload using one or more file transfer mechanisms (e.g., wget, curl, ftpget, or tftp) followed by execution of the downloaded script via sh. This pattern is consistent with IoT botnet propagation and automated malware deployment.
| Reporter | Date | Category | Protocol | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| User | Mar 17, 2026, 22:47 | Brute Force | TELNET | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |