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167.94.138.202 has a low threat confidence level of 30%, originating from United States, on the Censys, Inc. network (398324). It has been observed across 982 sessions targeting HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, SIP, IMAP and 12 other protocols, First observed on January 20, 2026, most recently active March 7, 2026.
Client sends RTSP OPTIONS requests to check supported methods and confirm that an RTSP service is exposed, then disconnects without attempting authentication or stream setup. This pattern is typically associated with automated reconnaissance or internet-wide scanning rather than active stream access.
Identifies Redis service discovery and basic environment enumeration where an actor probes with invalid commands, validates availability using PING, retrieves server metadata via INFO (case variations), and gracefully exits with QUIT. This pattern is commonly used to fingerprint exposed Redis instances before exploitation.
Identifies an automated Redis service probing sequence consisting of PING, INFO (uppercase invocation), execution of a deliberately nonexistent command to assess error handling behavior, and QUIT. This tightly grouped pattern reflects reconnaissance and fingerprinting activity used by scanners and exploitation frameworks to determine Redis version, configuration details, and command availability prior to follow-on exploitation attempts. The inclusion of a nonexistent command indicates capability probing rather than normal client interaction.
Client connects to a MongoDB instance and issues isMaster followed by buildinfo, indicating an attempt to identify server role, capabilities, and software version. This pattern is commonly associated with automated discovery or fingerprinting of exposed MongoDB services rather than normal application activity.
Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.
SMTP interaction identified as an internet-wide scanning probe originating from Censys infrastructure. The client announces itself via EHLO www.censys.io and issues a STARTTLS request to verify TLS upgrade support and collect service capability metadata. This pattern reflects automated reconnaissance and exposure mapping rather than direct exploitation, but still represents active external probing of the SMTP service.
Identifies HTTPS requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration
Identifies HTTP GET requests directly targeting the /bad-request path, indicating automated or manual probing of application error-handling routes rather than legitimate navigation flow.
FTP session where the client issues AUTH TLS to upgrade the connection to Transport Layer Security. This reflects protocol-level encryption negotiation prior to further interaction.