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157.245.244.52 has a threat confidence score of 98%. This IP address from United States (AS14061, DigitalOcean, LLC) has been observed in 316 honeypot sessions targeting REDIS, POSTGRES, ELASTICSEARCH, MONGODB, MSSQL protocols. First observed on March 13, 2026, most recently active March 16, 2026.
Remote client performs structured MongoDB reconnaissance by initiating a wire-protocol handshake (ismaster / hello), executing the buildInfo command to obtain server version and build characteristics, and subsequently issuing listDatabases to enumerate all databases present on the instance. This sequence reflects systematic service validation and environment mapping activity commonly associated with automated internet-wide scanning, vulnerability assessment tooling, or pre-exploitation reconnaissance workflows.
Client first performs a generic request to the Elasticsearch root endpoint to verify service availability, then proceeds to request /_cat/indices. This sequence reflects staged Elasticsearch reconnaissance where the actor validates that the cluster is reachable before attempting index enumeration and data exposure assessment. Compared to direct index enumeration behaviors, the interaction begins with a service-validation step, suggesting adaptive probing rather than immediate Elasticsearch-specific targeting.
Identifies an automated Redis service probing sequence consisting of PING, INFO (uppercase invocation), execution of a deliberately nonexistent command to assess error handling behavior, and QUIT. This tightly grouped pattern reflects reconnaissance and fingerprinting activity used by scanners and exploitation frameworks to determine Redis version, configuration details, and command availability prior to follow-on exploitation attempts. The inclusion of a nonexistent command indicates capability probing rather than normal client interaction.
Client performs a direct request to the Elasticsearch /_cat/indices endpoint and retrieves a successful response without preceding generic web discovery or multi-protocol probing. This behavior indicates targeted Elasticsearch reconnaissance focused on enumerating available indices, document counts, and storage size to assess data exposure. Unlike broad internet scanners, the interaction is Elasticsearch-aware from the start, suggesting tooling or operators specifically searching for open clusters rather than conducting general service fingerprinting.