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152.32.226.203 has a threat confidence score of 93%. This IP address from Hong Kong (AS135377, UCLOUD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY HK LIMITED) has been observed in 336 honeypot sessions targeting HTTP, HTTPS, MONGODB, SMTP, POSTGRES and 8 other protocols. First observed on January 27, 2026, most recently active March 21, 2026.
Remote client performs MongoDB service validation and environment fingerprinting by first initiating a wire-protocol handshake (ismaster / hello) followed by execution of the buildInfo command against the admin database. This sequence indicates targeted reconnaissance to determine server role, software version, build characteristics, and platform details. Such activity is commonly associated with automated scanning frameworks and pre-exploitation tooling used to assess exposure and identify version-specific vulnerabilities prior to authentication attempts or database enumeration
Client sends RTSP OPTIONS requests to check supported methods and confirm that an RTSP service is exposed, then disconnects without attempting authentication or stream setup. This pattern is typically associated with automated reconnaissance or internet-wide scanning rather than active stream access.
Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.
Identifies HTTPS requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration
Automated SMTP interaction performing a minimal capability check by issuing EHLO followed by a STARTTLS upgrade request and immediately terminating the session. This pattern is commonly associated with internet-wide scanners, security research crawlers, or opportunistic bots verifying whether an SMTP service supports encrypted communication. The absence of authentication attempts or message submission indicates reconnaissance or service fingerprinting rather than active abuse.
FTP session where the client issues AUTH TLS to upgrade the connection to Transport Layer Security. This reflects protocol-level encryption negotiation prior to further interaction.
Identifies HTTP GET requests directly targeting the /bad-request path, indicating automated or manual probing of application error-handling routes rather than legitimate navigation flow.