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152.32.183.22 has a threat confidence score of 97%. This IP address from United States (AS135377, UCLOUD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY HK LIMITED) has been observed in 373 honeypot sessions and reported 1 times targeting SMTP, SMB, FTP, IMAP, SIP and 8 other protocols. First observed on January 31, 2026, most recently active March 28, 2026.
Composite behavior identifying authenticated SMB interaction where a client accesses the IPC$ share, performs root directory reads, binds to the SAMR RPC interface, and interacts with the SRVSVC service pipe. This sequence is consistent with remote host and account enumeration activity over SMB, typically used to gather domain, user, and share information prior to lateral movement or privilege escalation attempts.
SMB session opening IPC$, accessing and binding to the srvsvc pipe, then reading the root directory. Enumerates available shares without further traversal.
Client sends RTSP OPTIONS requests to check supported methods and confirm that an RTSP service is exposed, then disconnects without attempting authentication or stream setup. This pattern is typically associated with automated reconnaissance or internet-wide scanning rather than active stream access.
FTP session where an empty control-channel command is observed in conjunction with non-printable binary data on the control channel. This pattern reflects malformed or non-FTP-compliant input, commonly seen during TLS handshake attempts on plaintext endpoints, protocol confusion, or automated scanner misfires.
Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.
Identifies HTTP GET requests directly targeting the /bad-request path, indicating automated or manual probing of application error-handling routes rather than legitimate navigation flow.
Client issues MongoDB serverStatus requests and disconnects shortly after, indicating service inspection rather than active database interaction. This pattern is commonly associated with automated discovery activity where scanners collect runtime metrics or confirm database exposure without performing further queries.
| Reporter | Date | Category | Protocol | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| User | Mar 9, 2026, 03:42 | Brute Force | DOCKER | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |