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147.185.132.210 has a very high threat confidence level of 97%, originating from United States, on the Google LLC network (396982). It has been observed across 195 sessions targeting HTTP, IMAP, SSH, FTP, SMB and 13 other protocols, First observed on January 20, 2026, most recently active March 11, 2026.
Identifies RDP clients attempting authentication using the legacy RDP security mode where credentials are exchanged through the older RDP security layer instead of Network Level Authentication (NLA). This indicates the client negotiated legacy plaintext authentication during the RDP security handshake
Client sends RTSP OPTIONS requests to check supported methods and confirm that an RTSP service is exposed, then disconnects without attempting authentication or stream setup. This pattern is typically associated with automated reconnaissance or internet-wide scanning rather than active stream access.
FTP session where the client issues AUTH TLS to upgrade the connection to Transport Layer Security. This reflects protocol-level encryption negotiation prior to further interaction.
Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.
Identifies execution of the Redis INFO command (case-insensitive), which retrieves server configuration, version, memory usage, and runtime statistics. This behavior reflects service interrogation and environment fingerprinting activity. While INFO can be used legitimately by administrators, it is also commonly observed during automated scanning and pre-exploitation reconnaissance of exposed Redis instances.
Identifies HTTPS requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration
Identifies HTTP GET requests directly targeting the /bad-request path, indicating automated or manual probing of application error-handling routes rather than legitimate navigation flow.
Client repeatedly sends GET requests to the /bad-request Docker API endpoint, indicating malformed or incompatible traffic against the Docker daemon. This pattern is typically associated with generic internet scanning or tools attempting HTTP interaction without speaking the proper Docker API protocol.
| Date | Category | Protocol | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mar 8, 2026 | Brute Force | HTTP | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |
| Mar 7, 2026 | Brute Force | HTTP | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |