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118.193.32.88 has a threat confidence score of 97%. This IP address from Hong Kong (AS135377, UCLOUD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY HK LIMITED) has been observed in 177 honeypot sessions and reported 1 times targeting FTP, IMAP, SMB, SMTP, SSH and 4 other protocols. First observed on January 30, 2026, most recently active March 22, 2026.
FTP session where a client probes for valid usernames, attempts authentication, switches to ASCII mode, and enters passive mode without performing explicit file listing or transfer operations. This reflects a completed login and session setup sequence, often observed during credential validation or preparatory access prior to further activity.
SMB session opening IPC$, accessing and binding to the srvsvc pipe, then reading the root directory. Enumerates available shares without further traversal.
Composite behavior identifying authenticated SMB interaction where a client accesses the IPC$ share, performs root directory reads, binds to the SAMR RPC interface, and interacts with the SRVSVC service pipe. This sequence is consistent with remote host and account enumeration activity over SMB, typically used to gather domain, user, and share information prior to lateral movement or privilege escalation attempts.
FTP session where an empty control-channel command is observed in conjunction with non-printable binary data on the control channel. This pattern reflects malformed or non-FTP-compliant input, commonly seen during TLS handshake attempts on plaintext endpoints, protocol confusion, or automated scanner misfires.
Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.
FTP session where the client issues AUTH TLS to upgrade the connection to Transport Layer Security. This reflects protocol-level encryption negotiation prior to further interaction.
Identifies execution of the Redis INFO command (case-insensitive), which retrieves server configuration, version, memory usage, and runtime statistics. This behavior reflects service interrogation and environment fingerprinting activity. While INFO can be used legitimately by administrators, it is also commonly observed during automated scanning and pre-exploitation reconnaissance of exposed Redis instances.
| Reporter | Date | Category | Protocol | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| User | Mar 5, 2026, 06:11 | Brute Force | TELNET | SikkerGuard: 2 blocked packets |