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109.105.209.7 has a threat confidence score of 100%. This IP address from Portugal (AS21859, Zenlayer Inc) has been observed in 451 honeypot sessions and reported 5 times targeting HTTPS, IMAP, FTP, RTSP, RDP and 10 other protocols. First observed on January 20, 2026, most recently active March 20, 2026.
Identifies RDP clients attempting authentication using the legacy RDP security mode where credentials are exchanged through the older RDP security layer instead of Network Level Authentication (NLA). This indicates the client negotiated legacy plaintext authentication during the RDP security handshake
Client performs a full RTSP interaction sequence — OPTIONS, DESCRIBE, SETUP, and PLAY — indicating an attempt to initialize and access a media stream. This pattern reflects active interaction with a streaming service rather than simple probing, and is commonly seen when automated tools or unauthorized clients try to view exposed camera or RTSP feeds.
Identifies JSON-RPC initialize requests from the gitmc-org-mcp-scanner client delivered via HTTP GET, indicating automated scanning activity using a non-standard transport method for JSON-RPC initialization.
Client sends RTSP OPTIONS requests to check supported methods and confirm that an RTSP service is exposed, then disconnects without attempting authentication or stream setup. This pattern is typically associated with automated reconnaissance or internet-wide scanning rather than active stream access.
FTP session where the client issues AUTH TLS to upgrade the connection to Transport Layer Security. This reflects protocol-level encryption negotiation prior to further interaction.
Identifies execution of the Redis INFO command (case-insensitive), which retrieves server configuration, version, memory usage, and runtime statistics. This behavior reflects service interrogation and environment fingerprinting activity. While INFO can be used legitimately by administrators, it is also commonly observed during automated scanning and pre-exploitation reconnaissance of exposed Redis instances.
Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.
Identifies HTTPS requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration
| Reporter | Date | Category | Protocol | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| User | Mar 15, 2026, 15:53 | Brute Force | FTP | SikkerGuard: 22 blocked packets |
| User | Mar 15, 2026, 15:48 | Brute Force | FTP | SikkerGuard: 34 blocked packets |
| User | Mar 13, 2026, 17:50 | Brute Force | HTTPS | SikkerGuard: 28 blocked packets |
| User | Mar 13, 2026, 17:45 | Brute Force | HTTPS | SikkerGuard: 6 blocked packets |
| User | Mar 1, 2026, 14:45 | Brute Force | HTTPS | SikkerGuard: 34 blocked packets |