Automated MCP endpoint scanning over HTTPS using JSON-RPC initialize requests from gitmc-org-mcp-scanner, combined with probing of /mcp and /sse endpoints.

Client performs a full RTSP interaction sequence — OPTIONS, DESCRIBE, SETUP, and PLAY — indicating an attempt to initialize and access a media stream. This pattern reflects active interaction with a streaming service rather than simple probing, and is commonly seen when automated tools or unauthorized clients try to view exposed camera or RTSP feeds.

Identifies RDP clients attempting authentication using the legacy RDP security mode where credentials are exchanged through the older RDP security layer instead of Network Level Authentication (NLA). This indicates the client negotiated legacy plaintext authentication during the RDP security handshake

Identifies JSON-RPC initialize requests from the gitmc-org-mcp-scanner client delivered via HTTP GET, indicating automated scanning activity using a non-standard transport method for JSON-RPC initialization.

SIP request using sip:nm as the Request-URI, a malformed or placeholder target commonly observed in SIP scanning and fuzzing activity rather than legitimate client behavior.

Client sends RTSP OPTIONS requests to check supported methods and confirm that an RTSP service is exposed, then disconnects without attempting authentication or stream setup. This pattern is typically associated with automated reconnaissance or internet-wide scanning rather than active stream access.

FTP session where the client issues AUTH TLS to upgrade the connection to Transport Layer Security. This reflects protocol-level encryption negotiation prior to further interaction.

Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.

HTTP request using GET method.

Identifies execution of the Redis INFO command (case-insensitive), which retrieves server configuration, version, memory usage, and runtime statistics. This behavior reflects service interrogation and environment fingerprinting activity. While INFO can be used legitimately by administrators, it is also commonly observed during automated scanning and pre-exploitation reconnaissance of exposed Redis instances.