Client sends RTSP OPTIONS requests to check supported methods and confirm that an RTSP service is exposed, then disconnects without attempting authentication or stream setup. This pattern is typically associated with automated reconnaissance or internet-wide scanning rather than active stream access.

The client authenticated to a Redis service and executed the INFO command (info / redis_info_lowercase) without attempting configuration changes, data access, or command execution. The INFO command retrieves server metadata including version, role (master/replica), connected clients, memory usage, persistence settings, and replication status. This behavior is consistent with automated reconnaissance activity where a bot validates exposure, fingerprints the Redis instance, and determines whether it is a viable target for follow-up exploitation (e.g., replication abuse, module loading, or persistence manipulation). No destructive or modification activity was observed in this session.

Identifies HTTP requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration.

Identifies HTTPS requests targeting the web server root path ("/"), typically used for initial service discovery, host validation, or baseline content inspection prior to deeper enumeration

Client repeatedly sends GET requests to the /bad-request Docker API endpoint, indicating malformed or incompatible traffic against the Docker daemon. This pattern is typically associated with generic internet scanning or tools attempting HTTP interaction without speaking the proper Docker API protocol.